iMessage端到端加密:我们必须接受Apple的话语

今年早些时候,有关美国的启示政府/执法监听曝光后,Apple公布了“对客户隐私的承诺”。它部分地说

Apple has always placed a priority on protecting our customers’ personal data, and we don’t collect or maintain a mountain of personal details about our customers in the first placeThere are certain categories of information which we do not provide to law enforcement or any other group because we choose not to retain it.

For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read themApple cannot decrypt that data.

本周,安全Quarkslab的研究人员发表了一份白皮书对此提出异议,声称,在顶部:

  • 我们是什么说:Apple会读取您的iMessages。

  • What we are saying: Apple can read your iMessages if they choose to, or if they are required to do so by a government order.

正如Apple声称的那样,存在端到端加密The weakness is in the key infrastructure as it is controlled by Apple: they can change a key anytime they want, thus read the content of our iMessages.

在AllThingsD写作,John Paczkowski报道

Asked by AllThingsD if the firms’s claim is legitimate, renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier replied with a definitive yes“The researchers show that iMessage could be undetectably designed to intercept and read messages, not that it is designed to do so,” Schneier said.

但是苹果公​​司坚持认为它不是那么有动力And it stands by its June claims about iMessage’s securityApple says that QuarksLab’s theory is just that — a theory, and one that would require a re-architecting of iMessage for it ever to be a threat in the real world.

“iMessage is not architected to allow Apple to read messages,” said Apple spokeswoman Trudy Muller in a statement to AllThingsD. “The research discussed theoretical vulnerabilities that would require Apple to re-engineer the iMessage system to exploit it, and Apple has no plans or intentions to do so.”

换句话说,这在很多方面都是关于它们之间差异的语义论证能够可能Quarkslab的研究证明了这一点(我读过这篇论文并承认我发现它很大程度上是我的头脑 - 但我会接受Schneier对其有效性的担保)是Apple的iMessage后端可以被设计为允许Apple拦截和阅读消息内容,我们无法像iMessage用户那样检测到它。

What Apple has said, and reiterated today, is that iMessage’s back-end is not in fact designed in that way — that there is no mechanism in the system for Apple employees to surreptitiously change the encryption key to allow for messages to be decrypted during transit.

因此,我认为Ars Technica的Dan Goodin把事情做得太过分了他关于Quarkslab调查结果的报告, 写作:

与公众声称相反,Apple员工能够read communications sent with its iMessage service, according to researchers who have reverse engineered it.

这不是Quarkslab证明的他们证明的是Apple可能并且我们作为用户无法以加密方式验证它们不是。

归结为Apple的话。

如果你相信甚至怀疑苹果公司对此撒谎,那么至少考虑一下Apple这样做会带来巨大的风险如果他们实际上允许执法部门或国家安全局秘密解密iMessage内容,那么如果它们被曝光,他们的企业信誉将遭受巨大的,可能是不可挽回的损失在执法的情况下,起诉中使用的解密iMessage内容必须在法庭上作为证据披露对于像国家安全局这样的秘密机构,完全有可能爱德华斯诺登已经掌握了这样一个后门的证据,即使不是这样,苹果仍会永远冒着另一个举报人揭露这种事情的风险。

Leaving aside the moral implications of flat-out lying to their customers, I would think that if iMessage’s back-end were designed with a weakness exploitable by Apple as Quarkslab supposes, Apple would say or promise nothing with regard to iMessage’s susceptibility to server-side decryption rather than compound that weakness with blatant lies to the contrary说谎是为了获得相对较小的PR收益而承担巨大的公关风险我之所以说“小PR增益”只是因为我怀疑大多数使用iMessage的人都知道他们的消息应该是从端到端安全地加密的我说“大公关风险”是因为如果苹果公司关于iMessage加密的声明最终失去信誉,那么媒体的强烈反对将是严重的(并且恰到好处)。

边注:我的理解是Apple不会在其服务器上永久存储iMessage消息内容即使是加密形式,iMessage数据也仅限于Apple在传输过程中一旦交付,它就消失了[更新:或者,也许更好地说,交付后的一段时间,它已经消失了我不知道,苹果将在多长时间内保留待发送的消息在某些情况下,它似乎是几天,因为任何人已经使用了几天离线并且收到突然爆发的iMessages的设备可以证明。]这是设计在今年早些时候与苹果公司的一位消息人士进行的一次讨论中,我被告知,不久之前,有消息称,只要有可能,1Apple的消息服务应该以这样一种方式设计,即没有任何东西 - 或者至少是尽可能少的数据 - 存储或记录给执法机构要求在传输过程中解密内容也是如此这是一个不同寻常的看法:Apple关注客户隐私,并知道根本不存储任何东西是保护它的唯一方法一个玩世不恭的看法:苹果公司试图在这些问题上洗手。)


  1. 因此,例如,这不适用于iCloud电子邮件Email is by design susceptible in numerous ways: it’s usually transmitted in plain text and it’s stored on the server. ↩︎